

was in progress. He at once left his position at the bridge with the greater part of his command, and, sending to his superior officer the important news which had just reached him, inarched his troops a mile or so to his left and rear, and took up a position to receive the attack of the enemy.

Although Beauregard says that he expected all attack in this direction, he had made no preparations to resist one. He had, in fact, a more comprehensive and daring scheme in his mind than a mere repulse of McDowell's turning movement. He had planned to throw the bulk of his army across Bull Run by the lower fords; and he expected by moving promptly upon Centreville, to possess himself of the Federal line of retreat. He had intended that this movement should be begun by 7.30 A.M. at the latest, and his orders were actually despatched from Manassas Junction at 5.30.* But the order to General Ewell miscarried; and, as his brigade was to have been the first to cross, the different columns were kept waiting at the various fords on the right bank of the stream, until, as General Beauregard himself put it, "the enemy was about to annihilate the left flank" of the Confederate army, "and had to be met and checked there, for otherwise he would have taken them a in flank and in rear, and

all would
have been lost.¹³

Nothing in fact could be more complete
than the
change in the Confederate programme
effected by

¹ Report, 2 W. R., 486.

² Beauregard to K. Manas, Ms., 68.

³ *Ibid.*, Letter to Ewell, 117.